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THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF PoLMcs. By Alexander M. Bickel.* Indianapolis; New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962. Pp. ix, 303, $6.00.
PoLrcs AND THE WARREN COURT. By Alexander M. Bickel.0 New
York: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. xii, 299, $6.95.
At a time when the Supreme Court finds in the constitutional guaran-
tees of liberty and of equality constantly expanding limitations on the
Congress and the States, enforcable by the judicial process, there is
urgent need for deep reflection on the role the Court performs in our
polity and for dispassionate appraisal of the basis of the judgments it
hands down. To develop that critique is not the task of any single group
in our culture but the legal professoriat is surely called upon to play a
major part. It can play that part best, in my opinion, by foregoing both
polemic and apologetic, striving rather for the disengagement that will
place the issues in perspective and for no less judiciousness in dealing
with their resolution than we should expect of courts. Professor Bickel's
effort to conform to this exacting standard gives distinction to these
books about the Constitution and the Court.
The earlier and more important work derives its title from Hamil-
ton's anticipation and defense of the judicial duty "to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void," in particular
his argument that "in a government in which [the different departments
of power] are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them."' The salute to Hamilton is no more than titular, how-
ever, for the main thrust of this full scale analysis of the basis, nature,
potentialities and techniques of judicial review inheres precisely in
forthright rejection of the reasoning enshrined in Marbury v. Madison,
in favor of a new and far more complex theory of the function of the
Supreme Court in its relation to the other organs of authority. Where
Hamilton and Marshall derived the judicial duty from the concept of
the Constitution as the "supreme law" and the duty of the courts as
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law interpreters, Bickel perceives no such compulsion in the history,
language or animating ideas of the document and probably would deem
it insufficient even if he were to find it there. The justification that he
deems to be essential, and in terms of which he supports and would
shape the judicial process, is the need in a democracy for an agency
empowered to endorse or to reject measures of the representative
branches as compatible or incompatible with principle, legitimating
or condemning governmental action on the basis of a principled de-
cision of the sort that politics alone cannot provide. As Mr. Bickel puts
it, "the root idea is that the process is justified only if it injects into
representative government something that is not already there; and
that is principle, standards of action that derive their worth from a long
view of society's spiritual as well as material needs and that command
adherence whether or not the immediate outcome is expedient or
agreeable" (p. 58).
This is not the whole of it, however, for Professor Bickel sees quite
clearly that no "society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one,
can fail in time to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise,
if it knows no ways of muddling through. No good society can be un-
principled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden" (p. 64). There
is a "tension between principle and expediency" that Mr. Bickel not
unreasonably terms "Lincolnian"; and the Supreme Court can main-
tain itself in this tension only by prudence in avoiding constitutional
decision, when governance by principle would cast a burden too severe.
The Court may reject or legitimate on principle; it also may do neither,
by prudently refusing to decide.
Much of the volume is concerned with a much needed study of what
Mr. Bickel deems the "passive virtues":- the formal techniques for
avoidance of decision that have been developed in the jurisprudence of
the Court. It deals at length with doctrines relating to standing, ripe-
ness, non-justiciable questions, interpretation designed to eliminate the
need for constitutional determination-to which Professor Bickel would
assimilate such constitutional conceptions as the ban upon excessive
vagueness, which call at most for legislative reconsideration and re-
drafting of a measure that may otherwise survive. These are, Professor
Bickel tells us, "the techniques that allow leeway to expediency with-
out abandoning principle" and thus "make possible a principled gov-
ernment" (p. 71). They are, in his view, like the discretion not to decide
overtly conferred on the Supreme Court by the certiorari jurisdiction-
2. For an earlier and shorter presentation, see Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term
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an area in which principle may properly give way to prudence as the
test of whether or not the Court should be involved.
I need not say that this is an analysis of the judicial obligation
markedly at variance with the received tradition and with the Court's
own articulation of the nature and the sources of its duty. Professor
Bickel would not differ on these points. He argues, if I understand him
rightly, that the function of the Court ought to be understood and re-
defined in the terms that he advances; that such terms alone make it
acceptable in a self-governing democracy; and that, to some extent at
least, redefinition in such terms would describe and explain prevailing
practice better and more candidly than the prevailing theory.
My difficulty with Professor Bickel's thesis does not stem from dis-
agreement with his point that when the Court finds action of the other
branches of the government or of a state forbidden or permitted by the
Constitution, it is obligated by the nature of its function to reach judg-
ment by a principled decision, or, further, that when judgment rests
upon the open-ended formulations of the Constitution, the principle
demanded is not far removed from an elaboration of what decency, as
our culture understands it, deems to be beyond the pale. That is a point
I have insisted on myself in a submission3 that Professor Bickel treats
with far more generosity and understanding than it usually has re-
ceived. His discussion of the demands of principle in dealing with such
problems as racial segregation, legislative malapportionment, movie
censorship, Congressional investigations, security clearance, travel con-
trol and anti-contraceptive legislation yields a brilliant and incisive
commentary on some of the most testing issues that the Court has had
to face in recent years.
It is, however, one thing to contend that principled determinations
as distinguished from ad hoc pronouncements are intrinsic to the func-
tion of a court when it elaborates the content of the constitutional pro-
visions to which it accords the force of law. It is a very different thing
to argue, as Professor Bickel does, that what the Supreme Court does
not condemn it must defend and legitimate in terms of principle or
else find ways to avoid passing on at all. This is to divorce the Court
entirely from the text that it interprets and administers and ultimately
to equate completely what is constitutional and what is good. I doubt
that our polity would be improved if this conception were accepted.
That no court would feel justified in so defining its responsibility and
3. See Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law in VEdstM, PMNcsPLXS,
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asking for the acquiescence of the other branches seems to me to be
entirely clear.
Professor Bickel might reply that he does not purport to write about
the courts in general, which he acknowledges "must, indeed, resolve all
controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative is chaos,"
but only about the Supreme Court which "in constitutional cases sits
to render an additional, principled judgment on what has already
been authoritatively ordered" (p. 173). But the conception of judicial
review has never been regarded as a special doctrine governing the role
of the Supreme Court as distinguished from the lower courts in the
judicial hierarchy; and the techniques for the avoidance of decision
that Bickel so lucidly discusses are addressed to the propriety of any
judicial intervention, not merely to adjudication by the highest court.
The only special rules relating to the Supreme Court are those de-
fining its appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution quite explicitly
commits to the control of Congress, not to the self-regulation of the
Court. Because this is so, there is, indeed, a simple method of achieving
Mr. Bickel's goal of giving the Supreme Court full discretion to avoid
involvement in decision, to wit, the amendment of the statutes govern-
ing appellate jurisdiction to substitute certiorari for appeal in the few
situations where appeal has been preserved. If there is the need that
Mr. Bickel sees for safeguarding the highest court against a duty to
decide, when principled decision would involve imprudent interven-
tion, that surely is the means that our system provides for achievement
of the end.
The difference is that this would call for action by the political
branches which in the prevailing statute have preserved an area of an
obligating jurisdiction-an area in which the masters of prudential
judgment thus far have considered that law rather than prudence ought
to be the measure of the duty to decide. Within that area, the need for
principled decision as to what is subject to adjudication seems to me no
less than that for principled adjudication of the merits of the issues that
the Court decides.
To say this is not, however, to deny that there have been occasions
when the Court has seemed to disregard the statutory mandate-Naim
v. Naim4 and Poe v. Ullman5 are the recent most egregious illustra-
tions, though in Poe there was an effort at a reasoned explanation, an
effort that I agree with Mr. Bickel plainly failed. Some of the older
cases holding questions non-justiciable because "political" fall, in my
4. 350 US. 891 (1955); 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
5. 567 U.S. 497 (1961).
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view, in the same class. I submit, however, that these should be taken
as anomolous departures from judicial duty rather than as the material
for a redefinition of judicial obligation, as I think Professor Bickel
would contend. Apart from the legal difficulties faced by that conten-
tion, the position seems to me to be quite plainly self-defeating, re-
sulting, as Professor Gerald Gunther puts it, in "100% insistence on
principle, 20% of the time."6 This is, in any case, the crucial issue
that the reader should consider as he works through this exciting volume
on the function of the Court. Those who are the least persuaded on
the central thesis will be stimulated by the verve of the discussion and
appreciate the wealth of insight Mr. Bickel offers on the potentialities
and limitations of the Court in the governance of great affairs.
The running commentary on recent and current problems that I find
so rewarding in The Least Dangerous Branch is continued and ex-
panded in Politics and the Warren Court. This is in major part a col-
lection and revision of a host of previously published papers, many of
them drawn from Mr. Bickel's contributions to the New Republic in
the last few years. It includes, though regrettably in smaller type in an
Appendix, the brilliant study of the historical materials relating to the
expectations of the generation that framed and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment as to its impact on state racial segregation, presented in the
Harvard Law Review in 1955.7 Miscellany though the volume is, suc-
cessful editing has given it both unity and continuity, well justifying
the decision to accord these papers the availability and durability hard
covers will provide.
Despite the title, the reader should not expect a work concerned ex-
clusively with the judicial process. Perhaps a half is given to a study of
the sequel to the School Decision, further discussion of the apportion-
ment decisions and a brief comment on the school prayer cases of 1962
and 1963. The rest is concerned with the legislative and executive ac-
tion produced by the Civil Rights and Negro Protest movements, in-
cluding an appraisal of the record of the Kennedy Administration,
reflections on the uses and abuses of civil disobedience as a technique
of protest, and detailed examination of the Civil Rights Acts passed
in 1964 and 1965.
This second portion of the book is its distinctive contribution. Here
Mr. Bickel has full scope for picturing the complex functioning of moral
6. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 1, 3 (1964).




sentiment when it gives birth to change in law. The agent of the change
is here, however, not the dictate of a court but the responsiveness of
the political branches to the claims of a minority that touched the con-
science of the country and thus marshaled general support. To be sure,
the Court played a large part in this awakening of moral sensitivity, a
fact that should forewarn us against too simplistic a conception of the
discrete roles of law and politics. It is, indeed, the fact that Mr. Bickel
sees the intricacy of their interplay that lends such great importance to
this subtle study of the most transforming legal movement of our time.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLrITcAL
ORGANS OF THE UNrIED NATIONS. By Rosalyn Higgins.* Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1963. Pp. xxi, 402.
Mrs. Higgins' excellent book concerns precisely what its title de-
notes. It analyzes the development of international law through the
practice of the "political organs" of the United Nations: the General
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat. It does not deal with the
development of international law by the International Court of Justice,
the International Law Commission, or by law-making conferences held
under the auspices of the United Nations (such as those on the law of
the sea and diplomatic relations). The Sixth (Legal) Committee of the
General Assembly is treated more as a legal than a political organ, and
thus largely not dealt with, on the ground that: "The work of that
Committee has become more and more restricted and political problems
with important legal implications are debated in the First and Ad Hoc
Committees" (p. 3). While an accurate appraisal at one time, it is no
longer wholly so. Since 1961, the Sixth Committee has been increasingly
concerned with a spectrum of problems of important political as well as
legal content which are embraced by its continuing item of "Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
Mrs. Higgins maintains that:
The political organs of the United Nations ...are vitally con-
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
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